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This paper proposes theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of capital controls and alternative
exchange rate regimes on the patterns of speculative capital. I argue that the exchange rate regime
and its interaction with the monetary regime can explain the patterns of speculative capital around
the world. I show that speculative capitals are more likely to flow into countries in which there is
a contradiction between the monetary and the exchange regimes, e.g. more likely in countries with
managed exchange rates. I model exchange-rate as a jump process in a stochastic dynamic portfolio
optimization. Through this approach, the influence of the frequency and the size of “jumps” in the
exchange rate on the allocation of speculative capital can be determined. It will also allow inflows
to be endogenous. By linking the jumps to the frequency of exchange rate movements, this paper
determines the effectiveness of different exchange rate regimes in fending off “hot money” for a given
monetary regime. On the empirical side, I use a newly constructed data set to verify the theoretical
predictions of the determinants and the patterns of speculative capital. Capital controls do not affect
speculative capital.
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“Since the adoption of this regime, the nature of capital flows to Mexico has shifted from mainly
short-term to long-term in nature. To give you an idea, before the crisis of 1990 to 1994, foreigners had
over $34 billion in short-term investments in Mexico. As of today, they have less than $2 billion. That
reduction can be attributed to the floating exchange-rate regime.” Agustin G. Carstens (1998)a
aGovernor of Central Bank of Mexico
The above quote highlights the fact that between 1994 and 1998, the amount of short-term
capital inflows to Mexico was divided by seventeen because of the exchange rate flexibility.
This paper tries to rationalize this theoretically, empirically and look beyond Mexico.
The 1990s is still generally called the lost decade for some emerging countries, particularly
Asian countries. The financial turmoils in Mexico (1995), Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand
(1997), Russia (1998), and Brazil (1999) were mainly due to foreign capital flight. As noted
by Rodrik and Velasco (1999), all these countries had one thing in common: a large level
of short-term foreign debt. Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) and others found that foreign
direct investment reduces the likelihood of financial crises, whereas short-term capital flows
increase it. In retrospect the ‘’key question is therefore why do some economies at certain time receive
much more short-term flows?” Hoggarth and Sterne (1997). This paper attempts to provide
the answers to this question by examining the role of capital controls and exchange rate
regimes from a short term perspective on the distribution of speculative capital worldwide
both theoretically and empirically. In this paper, I adopt the definition of speculative capital
given by Kant (1996): “Money that responds quickly to political or financial crisis, to expectations
of tighter capital controls or the devaluation of the domestic currency, or to changes in after-tax real
return”. With this definition of speculative capital flows, I can approximate it by short-term
capital flows.
The main characteristic of short-term capital inflows is their dependence on short-term
interest rates, thus it also depends on monetary policy when it is used to fight inflation.
In other words, short-term capital inflows must be a result of speculators’ positions taking
advantage of heterogeneity in monetary regimes across different countries. But, nowadays,
many countries conduct ‘’active monetary policies” which consist of fighting inflation through
changes in their nominal interest rates, e.g. when inflation increases, countries choose to fight
inflation by raising their nominal interest rates. This paper argues that even if monetary
regimes become more and more homogeneous across countries, huge differences between
their exchange rate regimes can explain the pattern of speculative capital inflows. I build
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a portfolio balance model which takes into account these differences in the exchange rate
regimes. In a stochastic dynamic optimization framework, inflation is a diffusion process
and exchange rate adjustment a jump process. This framework focuses, in particular, on the
uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP). Since a violation of UIP allows for arbitrage
profits, it is traditionally assumed to hold at all times. Empirical researches such as Chinn
(2006) show, however, that deviations do occur. For reasons such as exchange rates forecasting
errors (Campbell-Pownall et al. (2007)), UIP does not always hold in the short term. The model
allows for temporary deviations from UIP and thus identifies, among other factors, the role of
exchange rate regime and the frequency of exchange rate adjustments on speculative capital1.
The influence of monetary policy on exchange rates is an important pillar of this mecha-
nism. This literature starts with Dornbusch (1976). Obstfeld and Rogoff (1984) finds that the
Mussa and Barro-Grossman rules yield structurally equivalent exchange rate models. Unex-
pected currency depreciations are explained as a result of a surprise inflation policy by the
central bank in Penati and Pennacchi (1989). Finally, there are more technical strands on port-
folio management. The first consists of technical treatments for the solution of the stochastic
dynamic optimization. The seminal contribution of this sort is Merton (1992). The second
concerns the importance of skewness – unexpected jumps – in returns on asset prices such
as Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Martinez and Nava (2010). I model the link between the
monetary regime and the exchange rate regime in a simple way: by making the unexpected
size of the currency depreciations endogenous to the inflation rate and to the frenquency of
devaluations.
The existing empirical literature, Montiel and Reinhart (1999), Ariyoshi et al. (2000), Kamil
and Clements (2009), and others focused mainly on the role of capital controls. Most of the
studies reached the conclusion that capital controls do not play an important role in fending
off hot money and do not give another channel through which speculative capital inflows
can be avoided. The empirical part of this paper is in line with this literature, it shows that
capital controls do not affect short-term capital inflows. It also shows that managed exchange
rates are more likely to attract these types of capitals compared to flexible exchange rates.
The central message of this paper is that if the primary objective of policymakers is to fend
off ‘’hot money”, moving from a pegged exchange rate to a flexible exchange rate is more
efficient that imposing controls on inflows.
This paper is also linked to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). They studied the rela-
1Throughout the paper, I will not consider sterilization operation in order to manage capital inflows since it
requires widening the interest differential between the domestic and the international interest rates. This is more
likely to attract more short-term capital inflows than to prevent them
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tionship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth and showed that less flexible
exchange rate regimes are associated with slower growth. But Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2003) did not give the insights – the channels – through which countries with a more flexible
exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes 1.
This paper shows that short-term capital are more likely to flow in countries with pegged ex-
change rate regimes which implicitly means that countries with flexible exchange rate regimes
attract long-term capital inflows which can affect economic growth positively (see Eichengreen
et al. (2011)). In other words, this paper may give the channel between exchange rate regimes,
long-term capital inflows and economic growth.
To my limited knowledge, this is the first paper which investigates the geography of spec-
ulative capital flows. Rodrik and Velasco (1999) studied the determinants of short-term capital
flows but focused on one form of capital: short-term external debt. Moreover, they did not
distinguish the difference between gross and net capital flows and they did not consider the
role of capital controls or the nature of the exchange rate regimes in their analysis. They
identified the share of money supply over gross domestic product as the main determinant of
short-term external debt. In this paper, I focus on gross rather than net capital inflows. The
reason is that recent literature (Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) and Forbes and Warnock (2011))
highlights the importance of gross capital inflows that measure positions. This may help us
to better understand the abrupt movements in capital inflows. Recently Gourinchas (2012)
highlights that to understand vulnerabilities it is necessary to focus on gross capital inflows.
He also highlights that the measure of short-term liabilities should be more broader than the
standard measure of short-term external debt as in Rodrik and Velasco (1999) and should
include bank lending and money funds.
Empirically, I use an innovative data set on speculative capital to take into account these
issues and to determine the influence of the theoretically identified factors on speculative
capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and
gives descriptive statistics on the pattern of short-term capital inflows. The third section shows
a simple model which describes the mechanism, while section 4 examines the determinants
and the pattern of short-term capital using a new dataset. The last section 5 concludes.
1As Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) acknowledge, their ‘’paper opens more questions than it answers.”
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2 Data and Stylized Facts
2.1 Description of the Data
To document worldwide patterns of speculative capital flows, I have gathered a comprehen-
sive data set on capital flows by distinguishing short-term from long-term inflows, and gross
inflows from net inflows. The sample covers annual observations of 70 countries from 1980
to 2009. The sample is mainly dictated by the availability of the variable of interest: short-
term capital inflows. Except for this variable, the remaining variables mainly stem from the
World Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank). They are commonly used variables and
are well described in macroeconomic literature. Therefore, I devote more time describing the
short-term capital inflows.
Capital inflows: There is no data on international gross capital flows by maturities. In order
to document the pattern of short term capital flows, several choices were made while gathering
data. To distinguish between short-term capital flows and long-term capital flows, I use the
Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The BOPS
is divided into the three categories: Foreign direct investment (FDI), Portfolio investment,
and the Other investments. Each category is divided between assets and liabilities. I consider
FDI as a long term investment since it is ‘’an investment involving a long-term relationship
and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy” according
to the United Nations World Investment Report (UNCAD, 1999). In the BOPS, FDI assets are
called ‘’foreign direct investment abroad” and liabilities are called ‘’foreign direct investment
in reporting economy”. Even if Portfolio investment could be considered as short-term invest-
ment, some Portfolio investments can have long term motive. Therefore, for this study, I did
not consider Portfolio investments1. The third category which is Other investments, is mainly
composed by trade credit, loans and, currency and deposits. The BOPS provides information
on their maturities. Short-term investments are characterized by maturities less than one year
while the others are long-term investment. In this paper, long-term capital flows are Foreign
direct investment plus long-term flows from the category ‘’Other investment” in the BOPS
while short-term capital flows are short-term flows in the category ‘’Other investment”. In the
BOPS, all these categories, including assets and liabilities, are not aggregated. Consequently,
all these categories result from an aggregation of sub-categories.
For the reasons highlighted in the introduction, I am interested in gross capital inflows by
1As a supplement of this study, the reader can see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) “International Investment
Patterns” which focused exclusively on portfolio equity holdings across countries
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foreigners in this paper. But the balance of payments statistics report assets and liabilities in
net terms so they can be negative or positive, which is a challenge when trying to give gross
capital inflows a value. For example, an increase on the liabilities side vis-à-vis non-residents
is entered as positive value while a decrease is a negative value. Therefore, the negative
values of liabilities can be considered as capital outflows while negative values of assets can
be considered as capital inflows. Thus, I compute gross capital inflows – short and long –
using the following methodology:
Gross Capital In f lows = max(Liabilities, 0)−min(Assets, 0)
I compile datasets from 1980 to 2009 for 160 countries using this methodology. I follow Broner
et al. (2010) by dropping very small or very poor countries. Small countries are deleted
because “they might display an artificially high volume of financial transactions due to their
role as offshore financial centers or tax havens” and poor countries are deleted because they
“generally depend heavily on official aid flows that behave differently than private capital
flows”. Small countries had a gross national income (GNI) in 2005 that was less than four
billion U.S. dollars PPP adjusted, while poor countries had a GNI per capita smaller than
2,000 U.S dollars PPP adjusted. I ended up with 90 countries after applying this elimination
method.
The are some countries with large amount of missing data in the BOPS. All countries
that do not have at least 20 consecutive observations for capital inflows are dropped. This
eliminates another 20 countries and we are finally left with a sample of 70 countries that have
useful annual data. See table 7 for the list of countries included in the final sample.
Capital controls: The measure of capital controls is based on Chinn and Ito (2002). The index
depends on four variables: restrictions on the current account, restrictions on the financial
account, if the country has multiple exchange rates or not, and if there is a requirement to
surrender export receipts. The index is the principal component analysis factor of these three
variables.
Exchange rate regimes: The exchange rate regime classification is based on Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2003). They use a de facto classification of exchange rate regimes based on
cluster analysis techniques. Countries are sorted according to three variables: (i) Exchange
rate volatility, (ii) Volatility of exchange rate changes, and (iii) Volatility of reserves. They are
classified into three categories: 1 = float; 2 = intermediate and 3 = fixed.
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Quality of institutions: The Political Rights Index of the NGO Freedom House is used as
a proxy for the quality of institutions. A country with the highest score adheres to political
rights that are close to certain ideals (free and fair elections, competitive parties, minorities
have reasonable self government, etc.). I transform this index via a logistic transformation
to the interval between zero and one, where one is the best possible score for quality of
institutions.
Other variables: The remaining variables are taken from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) of the World Bank for September 2010. The inflation rate is in the form of annual log
differences of the consumer price index. Money and quasi money is the total money supply.
Real GDP growth and population size are also taken from the WDI. The nominal interest,
defined as the average of the deposit interest rate and the lending interest rate come from also
to the WDI.
2.2 Stylized Facts
Prior to a formal model or a formal econometric analysis, let us compute some basic de-
scriptive statistics. Table 1 shows, in billions of dollars, the average amount of short-term
capital inflows across exchange rate regimes during the last three decades. For each decade,
I compute the average amount of short-term capital inflows conditional on the nature of the
exchange rate regimes, e.g. peg, intermediate, or flexible. Note that for calculating the average
speculative capital, each country is weighted by the country’s GDP, PPP adjusted. A simple
comparison of the values in the table across line anticipates the main results of the paper.
These figures clearly show that there is a lot of heterogeneity in short-term capital across ex-
change rate regimes and the message is very clear: the more the exchange rate is flexible, the
lower the amount of short-term capital inflows.
Table 1: Short-Term Capital Inflows across Exchange Rate Regimes
Exchange Rate Regimes
Short-Term Capital Inflows
in billions of $ Hard Peg Intermediate Flexible
1980s 15.78 14.01 1.30
1990s 62.65 30.48 22.72
2000s 93.07 49.20 14.21
Sources: Balance Of Payments Statistics (BOPS) and author’s calculation. 1980-2009
How can these differences across exchange rate regimes be explained? As I highlighted
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in the introduction, the main characteristic of short-term capital inflows is their dependence
on nominal short-term interest rates set by monetary policies. However, diverging nominal
short-term interest rates across countries reflects only diverging inflation rates across countries
since countries with constantly higher long-term inflation rates have steadily higher nominal
interest rates, e.g. inflation differentials explain most of the nominal interest rate differentials,
see figure 1. The correlation between the two variables is equal to 83% in the sample.
Figure 1: Nominal Interest Rate vs Inflation Rate
Notes: The y-axis is the average between the lending and the deposit rates between 1980 and
2009. The x-axis is inflation rate between 1980 and 2009. The variables are defined in section 2.1.
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI) and author’s calculation.
In other words, short-term capital inflows are driven mainly by inflation rates. Why then,
are these differences between exchange rate regimes as shown in table 1? The answer is that
the higher level of inflation attracts short-term capital inflows only in the absence of exchange
rate risk, e.g. only if the exchange rate is pegged. In this case, the value of the exchange
rate is stable and foreign investors lower the risk of potential loses because there are rare
adjustments. Indeed, this is what I found in the data, see figure 2.
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(a) Adjustable Peg (b) Pure Floating
Figure 2: Sort-Term Capital Inflows and Inflation Conditional on Exchange Rate Regimes
Notes: The y-axis is the share of short-term capital inflows over total capital inflows. The x-axis is inflation in log-differences of CPI. The variables are defined
in section 2.1. For each year, I separated the sample between peg, intermediate, and flexible exchange rate regimes. I excluded intermediate exchange rate
regimes in order to compare hard peg and pure flexible exchange rate regimes. Conditional on the exchange rate regime – peg and flexible – for each country, I
computed the average share of short-term capital inflows over total inflows and the average inflation between 1980 and 2009. This leads to these two graphs.
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI, WB), Balance Of Payments Statistics (BOPS, IMF), and author’s calculation.
In panel 2a, the relationship between short-term capital inflows and inflation conditional
on the fact that the exchange rate is pegged is drawn. As we can see, the link between the two
variables is strongly positive. However, once the risk is introduced by allowing the exchange
to be flexible, the relationship disappears, see panel 2b. While this analysis is intentionally
simple, it intuitively demonstrates a clear relationship between short-term capital inflows,
inflation rates, and the nature of the exchange rate regimes. Simple descriptive statistics
already confirm the main hypothesis of this paper. Section 3 builds a simple model which
explains the mechanism. Section 4 checks to see if the result holds ceterus paribus under
statistical inferences.
3 A Simple Stylized Portfolio Balance Model
I built a simple model in order to show the link between exchange rate regimes, capital
controls and speculative capital inflows. In the model, the monetary regime of the country is
given: the country adjusts its nominal interest rate for any increase in its inflation rate. This
hypothesis comes from the fact that countries with consistently higher long-term inflation
rates have steadily higher nominal interest rates, see figure 1. Under this assumption, if the
exchange rate is flexible there is no exchange rate policy. I call this situation the pure monetary
regime. If the government decides to peg its currency, the government has to manage the
exchange and the monetary regimes. I call this situation the hybrid monetary regime. By taking
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as given the monetary policy1, I model the fact that speculative capital inflows is possible only
if the government moves from a pure to a hybrid monetary regime, which can help to explain
table 1 and figure 2.
The model that takes into account capital controls, the monetary regime, and the frequency of
the exchange rate adjustment is a little technical because it uses a stochastic calculus. Before I
present it, I will show a simple two period model which provides insights for the general and
more realistic model.
3.1 A Model in Two Periods
Before considering a fully dynamic model in section 3.2, I first illustrate the main mechanism
in a very simple two period model. The main research question remains the same: why do
some countries receive much more speculative capital inflows than others? The objective is to
determine the international distribution of speculative capital. I therefore consider an investor
with two different investment alternatives, one of them being a speculative investment. Even
in this simple framework, we can see how policy choices such as the exchange rate regime,
capital controls and macroeconomic characteristics such as inflation, influence a country’s
attractiveness to speculators. In this case, I use a portfolio balance approach to model spec-
ulative capital flows since they are easily reversible compared to foreign direct investment. I
use long-term capital flows as a given in this model because I’m only focusing on short-term
capital inflows.
3.1.1 Wealth and Utility
I model an international investor with initial wealth W0 who maximizes expected utility from
wealth in period 1. He has two investment projects to distribute his wealth. A long-term
project (L) and a short-term project (S).
W0 = S + L (1)




and (1−ω) = S
W0
(2)
1Contrary to a currency board or a dollarization, there is room for monetary policy under an adjustable peg.
For example, China raised its interest rates for the fifth time by 25 basis points basis on July 7, 2011 in order to
fight inflation. While having a pegged exchange rate vis-à-vis United States.
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The long term project is not risky and pays a return rr f . The return on the speculative project
is noted rspec and will be detailed in section 3.1.2. Wealth in the next period will therefore be
W1 = rr f L + rspecS
= rr fωW0 + rspec(1−ω)W0
= (ωrr f + (1−ω)rspec)W0 . (3)




in which utility is assumed to be logarithmic.
3.1.2 Return on Speculation in Two Periods
I start with a short illustration using two periods and later generalize in the continuous case. A
speculator living in home country H and investing in the foreign country F gets the following
return rspec from investing a dollar abroad:
rspec = RF + gs − piH. (5)
RF is the foreign nominal interest rate. gs is the change in the exchange rate that the investor
has to take into account since he has to convert his own currency into the foreign currency in
period 0 and back in period 1. Due to home inflation, the home investor looses piH.
For a quick experiment, I plug gs in two extreme scenarios: fully fixed and fully flexible
exchange rates in the foreign country (the home country is assumed to have flexible exchange
rates in both cases). I then return to the general scenario, which uses the extreme scenarios as
limiting cases.
If the currency and the good markets could function as a perfect market, the change in the
exchange rate would equals the difference between home inflation piH and foreign inflation
piF. This is the relative purchasing power parity (RPPP):
g f lexs = piH − piF. (6)
in which I denote the variables under a perfectly flexible exchange rate with the index f lex.
Substituting this into (5) we see that the speculator investing abroad earns exactly the real
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interest rate of the foreign country:
r f lexspec = RF + (piH − piF)− piH (7)
= RF − piF = rF
This means that foreign investors simply earn the real interest rate of the foreign country,
because the perfectly flexible exchange rate takes away all exchange rate risk. This case is
illustrated in figure 2b: under a pure flexible exchange rate regime, equation (7) says that
there is no relationship between short-term capital inflows (r f lexspec) and foreign inflation (piF),
e.g. correlation(r f lexspec ,piF) = 0. Indeed in the data, see figure 2b, this correlation is equal to
zero.
Now, let us assume that the foreign country fully pegs its currency to that of the home
country, a scenario we denote with peg. Then the exchange rate remains constant
gpegs = 0. (8)
Substituting this into (5) we obtain
rpegspec = RF − piH (9)
= rF + (piF − piH)
In this case the investor earns a nominal interest rate from abroad minus home inflation and
therefore benefits from a high inflation abroad. In other words, under a pegged exchange rate,
any positive inflation differential with respect to the anchor country is beneficial to investors.
This case is illustrated by the figure 2a: under a hard peg exchange rate regime, equation (9)
says that there is a positive relationship between short-term capital inflows (rpegspec) and foreign
inflation (piF), e.g. correlation(r
peg
spec,piF) > 0. Indeed in the data, see figure 2a, this correlation
is equal to 44.35%. 1.
Let’s assume that the foreign country in principle wants to keep the exchange rate pegged.
But once in a while it is forced to adjust the exchange rate by the difference in inflation rates.
The speculator knows that eventually the exchange rate will adjust, but cannot anticipate
exactly when the government chooses to do so. He therefore attaches a probability ρ to
the event of an adjustment occurring. This feature of occasional exchange rate adjustments
is based on the empirical literature concerning the uncovered interest rate parity (cf. Alexius




spec = rF, see Barro and Gordon (1983).
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(2001), Chinn (2006), and Campbell-Pownall et al. (2007) ), which says that there are deviations
from UIP in the short run, but that it holds in the long run.
In this scenario, the expected return to speculation becomes a weighted average of the two
limiting cases in (7) and (9):
rspec = (1− ρ)rpegspec + ρr f lexspec
= RF − piH + ρ(piH − piF)
ρ can also be interpreted as the exchange rate regime of the foreign government. A flexible exchange
rate is indicated by ρ = 1. As adjustments become every more rare, ρ decreases and finally
reaches a fixed exchange rate with ρ = 0. The link between ρ and the expected return to
speculation can be summarized as follow:
{ρ, rspec}

ρ = 1 if fully flexible exchange rate ⇒ rspec = rF
ρ = 0 if fully pegged exchange rate ⇒ rspec = rF + (piF − piH)
0 < ρ < 1 if adjustable peg exchange rate ⇒ rspec = rF + (piF − piH)(1− ρ)
Wealth in period 1 is with probability 1− ρ equal to
Wpeg1 = ωrr f + (1−ω)(RF − piH)
and with probability ρ:
W f lex1 = ωrr f + (1−ω)(RF − piF) .
Normalizing W0 = 1 and substituting (7) and (9) into (3) we obtain for expected utility:
E[U(W1)] = (1− ρ) log(Wpeg1 ) + ρ log(W f lex1 )
= (1− ρ) log(ωrr f + (1−ω)(RF − piH)) + ρ log(ωrr f + (1−ω)(RF − piF))(10)
3.1.3 Results in Two Periods
By maximizing the expected utility, it is possible to determine how the parameters affect the
allocation of international investors between short-term and long-term capital flows:
Proposition 1 (Discrete time) If inflation in the foreign country is higher than inflation in the home
country and that the real foreign interest rate is lower than the safe asset then:
The share of wealth invested in short-term capital (1−ω) will depend
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(i) positively on foreign inflation piF
(ii) negatively on the degree on the exchange rate flexiblity ρ
Proof See appendix 1’ 2
A higher foreign inflation increases the profits of the speculator in fear of no devaluation. This
increases the overall attractiveness for the speculator. Since a devaluation decreases the spec-
ulator’s profits, an increase in the probability of this event reduces speculative investments.
A very flexible exchange rate is characterized by a large probability for a devaluation, so ρ is
close to 1. In this case, arbitrage profits are minimal. However, a peg that is certain of not
experiencing a devaluation, that is, ρ = 0, allows speculators to earn arbitrage profits from
high foreign inflation since it drives up the nominal interest rate abroad and the profits made
abroad can be converted back using the same exchange rate used when the investment was
made.
3.2 The Continuous Time Model
A continuous time framework is necessary since in practice all these variables are dynamic.
The continuous time allows also to introduce more “ingredients” in the previous model. This
section extends the analysis from section 3.1 and includes it in a dynamic framework. Based
on the work from the two periods already studied, we can analyze to what degree it is affected
by the dynamic structure.
In order to theoretically find the determinants for the distribution of speculative capital
across countries, I use the point of view of an individual international investor. In the most
basic form considered here, the investor can choose between a speculative investment abroad
and a long-term investment project, which I call long-term capital flows (LCF) . The spec-
ulative investment is subject to exchange rate changes since it must be moved twice across
currency borders between countries with potentially very different inflation rates. The LCF
project has a long-term horizon and its return is therefore less affected by inflation and ex-
change rates risks.
The profitability of speculation crucially depends on the interplay between the exchange
rate and relative purchasing power parity (RPPP). If RPPP holds at all times (the exchange rate
is perfectly flexible or the peg is perfectly credible1) then speculators could make no arbitrage
profits between different currency zones and could ignore inflation differentials because they
will not be able to exploit exchange rate regime heterogeneity across different countries. Mo-
tivated by empirical results, I modeled skewed deviations of the exchange rate by introducing
1Or prices are not sticky (Dornbusch (1976)) but I abstract here from this last consideration
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a jump process for the exchange rate in the target country of the investor. This also allows us
to model the importance of skewness on the returns of portfolio choices.
The model is solved using stochastic dynamic optimization based on Merton (1969) and
similar treatments of portfolio theory.
3.2.1 Wealth and Utility
I model an international investor with initial wealth W0 and utility function
U(Wt) = log(Wt) (11)







where I0 is all available information at t = 0 and β is the discount rate. He maximizes utility
by allocating optimally between a speculative investment St and long term investment, Lt:
Wt = St + Lt (13)





(1−ωt) = StWt (15)




In this basic form, the LCF project is equivalent to a risk-free rate1. It is modeled to be
independent of inflation and exchange rates, so we can think of it as an investment in the
home country of the investor, another member country of a currency union or another country
1This paper focuses on the determinant of short-term capital inflows and abstract from the determinant of
long-term flows so the process of the last capital is simply modeled. Another rationale of this hypothesis is that
foreign direct investment is the main component of long-term capital inflows in the data presented earlier and
the main determinants of FDI are the levels of financial development, the quality of institutions, property rights,
productivity, etc. See Antras et al. (2009). These determinants make long-term capital more independent to short-
term monetary policy. The long-term capital can include a broader type of assets. For this, the reader can see
Kraay et al. (2005), Alfaro et al. (2007), Gourinchas and Rey (2007b) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) which
focused on long-term capital flows
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with similarly low inflation.
In order to determine the return to the speculative investment, I calculate its profitability
depending on the frequency of exchange rate adjustments:
3.2.2 Return to Speculation in Continuous Time
I generalize the previous illustration for a continuous time and I also introduce taxes on
speculation. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the inflation rate in the home
country is zero, piH = 0. Second, assume that the foreign country uses the following exchange
rate policy: it pegs the exchange rate for long times, but at random points devaluates the
currency very quickly. Then, speculators will benefit from the foreign inflation as long as the
exchange rate stays constant and also experience a sudden loss at times when the currency
devaluates.
Given these two assumptions, the continuous time can be written the same as in equation






+ piFt + gst (17)
drFt
rFt
= (1− τ)r0dt + σ0dxt (18)
piFt = εdt + σdzt (19)
gst = νdqt. (20)
The foreign real interest rate rF is modeled as a deterministic interest rate r0 plus a random
part. σ0 is the instantaneous volatility of the expected rate of return and xt is a standard
Wiener process. The deterministic rate can be reduced by the foreign government through a
tax τ ∈ [0, 1] on speculation in order to maintain an autonomy on monetary policy. The tax τ
on speculative investments represents the possibility of the foreign government to introduce
capital controls. For τ = 0 speculative capital is unrestricted, while for τ = 1 it is effectively
banned. This allows the foreign government to keep a fixed exchange rate, an autonomous
monetary policy and yet restrict speculative capital, thus respecting the “impossible trinity”
introduced by Mundell (1962) and Mundell (1963).
Similarly, inflation is given as a deterministic trend ε and zero-mean noise, where σ is volatility
and zt is a Wiener process. Without loss of generality, let normalize inflation in the home
country to zero. In this case, ε is equivalent to the inflation differential in the two periods
model (piF − piH). dxt and dzt are temporally independent normally distributed random
variables with E[dxt] = E[dzt] = 0 and Var[dxt] = Var[dzt] = dt. The linear relationship
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between the trend in the inflation process (ε) and the nominal return (dRt/Rt) is clear thanks
to figure 1. Furthemore, the relathionship can be rationalized by using the standard linear
Taylor rule in which the central bank focused only on inflation and not on output1.
Finally, the random devaluations by the foreign government are modeled as a Poisson
process qt with intensity λ and amplitude ν. This type of modeling allows for the exchange
rate to be endogenous and for investment strategies in speculative capital to be risky. The
endogenous characteristics and the uncertainty of the exchange rate are a result of the random
devaluations. The number of devaluations per unit of time is
Pr{one unit jump during dt} = Pr{dqt} = λdt + o(dt)
Combining equations (17) to (20), I obtain the following profit from speculation
dRt
Rt
= (1− τ)r0dt + σ0dxt + εdt + σdzt + νdqt (21)
The interest rate process and the exchange rate process will be linked through the uncov-
ered interest parity condition. Concerning the size of the exchange rate adjustments, I can
take guidance in the empirical literature on the uncovered interest rate parity (cf. Alexius
(2001), Chinn (2006), and Campbell-Pownall et al. (2007) ), which says that there are devi-
ations from the UIP in the short run, but that it holds in the long run. More interestingly,
Campbell-Pownall et al. (2007) provide the reasons for why the UIP condition does not hold
in the short run but is validated in the long run. First, they show that deviations from the
uncovered interest parity condition are mainly explained by exchange rates forecasting errors
and not by the risk premium factor. They also found that in the long run, exchange rate fore-
casting errors decrease progressively. In other words, in the short run, deviations from the













The expected return on a speculative investment equals the expected real interest rate in the
target country. Using the property of the Poisson process with intensity λ, E(dqt) = λ and
1In the new Keynesian framework, this allow also to stabilize output. In other words, central banks can only
focus on inflation management. This property is called divine coincidence by Blanchard and Gali (2007). But this is
beyond the scope of this paper.
2This is why this paper abstracts from risk premia considerations since deviations from UIP are almost ex-
plained by forecasting errors of the exchange rates rather than the risk premia. In this model, I do not model these
errors of forecasting but in the model the only sources of uncertainty are the ‘’jump” and the ‘’frequency” of the
exchange rates adjustment. So we may think that the forecasting errors of the exchange rate come from these two
sources of uncertainty.
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the fact that the relative purchasing power parity holds when the change in the exchange rate
equals the difference between home inflation (normalized to zero) and foreign inflation (e), I





I define the size of the exchange rate adjustments as |ν|, e.g. the absolute amount of the jump.
Equation (23) makes the depreciations of the foreign currency endogenous since it depends
(positively) on the inflation rate and (negatively) to the frequency of devaluations, which is
consistent intuitively. This is a simple way to model the interaction between the exchange rate
policy and the monetary policy. With this we can write the return to speculation as
dRt
Rt
= ((1− τ)r0 + ε)dt + σ0dxt + σdzt + ε
λ
dqt (24)
This equation shows that as long as the government keeps its exchange rate fixed, speculators
will make arbitrage profits and “earn the inflation rate” as an additional profit. But whenever
the exchange rate adjusts to restore long-run equilibrium, speculators will experience sudden
losses. See figures 2 and 3.
: slope of the curve 
Speculator’s profits: area under the curve 
: amplitude 
of the jump 
: average number of jumps per unit of time 
time 
Exchange rate 
Figure 3: Illustration of the parameters describing speculative profits




Wt + (1−ωt)dRtRt Wt ⇔
dWt
Wt
= ωtαdt + (1−ωt)((ε+ (1− τ)r0)dt + σdzt + σ0dxt + ε
λ
dqt) (25)




3.2.3 Results from Continuous Time
The first results concern the determinants of the investment shares. To obtain them, I solve the
model with a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Since this is standard procedure and rather
technical, the solution for this can be found as the proof of proposition 1’ in the appendix.
Proposition 1’ (Continuous time) The share of capital invested in short-term capital (1− ω) de-
pends:
(i) positively on the average level of inflation ε in the target country
(ii) negatively on the frequency of exchange rate adjustments λ
Proof See appendix 1’ 2
Part (i) means that since countries with steady higher long-term inflation rates have steadily
higher nominal interest rates, a high level of inflation attracts speculator’s capital even though
the exchange rate is adjusted occasionally. In this model, this is the case because inflation
pressures require a tighter monetary policy which for a given exchange rate, requires higher
interest rates that in turn attract more short-term capital inflows.
Part (ii) links the number of exchange rate adjustments to inflows of speculative capital. Recall
from equation (23) that the size of devaluating jumps ν is endogenously determined. But the
frequency of these jumps, λ is a free choice parameter belonging to the foreign government
(cf. equation (20)). This policy instrument allows the government to control the amount of
speculative capital without requiring restrictions on inflows. In the continuous time, λ can
be interpreted as the exchange rate regime of the foreign government, so λ is equivalent to ρ in the
discrete time. In the presence of short-term capital inflows, an increase in λ means a more
flexible exchange rate which increases the risk for investors and therefore eliminates the ‘’one-
sided bet” that a less flexible exchange rate would provide, see figures 2a and 2b for empirical
evidences.
From the perspective of the exchange rate regime, proposition 1’ (ii) can be expressed as:








(1−ω) = 0 .
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In economic terms, a fully flexible exchange rate regime minimizes the inflow of speculative
capital. A fully pegged exchange rate triggers large inflows of speculative capital. In between
the amount of speculative capital inflows increases as the exchange rate regime becomes less
flexible. A very flexible exchange rate is characterized by a large number of exchange rate
adjustments (λ big), each adjustment being small (ν small). In this case, arbitrage profits are
minimal. In the limiting case (λ → ∞), there is a permanent adjustment and no arbitrage
profits. However, peg that has rare and large exchange rate corrections (λ small, ν big), al-
lows speculators to earn arbitrage profits from high foreign inflation since it drives the foreign
nominal interest rate up. This theoretical reasoning is empirically illustrated in figure 4. Aus-
tralia and Malaysia’s exchange rates with respect to the U.S. dollar are illustrated. Australia is
characterized by continuous devaluations and therefore, the frequency of its exchange rate ad-
justments is high and as figure 4a shows, the size of each jump is small. For Malaysia, which
has a pegged exchange rate, exchange rate adjustments are rare but when they do occur,
they are large in size compared to continuous devaluations, see figure 4b. This is consistent
with the peso problem hypothesis. Large nominal interest rate differentials are possible even
though there is an absence of exchange rate changes. However, when these changes occur,
they tend to be large because of the uncovered parity condition, equation 22.
Since it is a given that the exchange rate regime is a parameter choice for the government,
why would the government want to choose anything other than a fully flexible exchange rate
regime? The reason for this, is that governments’ profit from fixed exchange rate because it
could increase exports. This can potentially lead to a positive net profit since tax revenues
from exporters exceed losses to foreign speculators. The details of this trade-off are however
beyond the scope of the current model, so government policy will remain exogenous.
The exchange rate regime is not the only option for controling speculative capital inflows,
at least theoretically. Established by the theory of the “impossible trinity”, a second option
is of course capital controls. The following proposition highlights another government policy
instrument. The tighter capital controls are, the lower the share invested.
Proposition 2 The share of capital invested in speculative investments (1−ω) depends negatively on
the tax on speculative capital (τ)
Proof See apprendix 2 2
Speculative capital inflows imply a loss for the foreign government since it is the source for
the speculator’s arbitrage profits. In other words, taxing capital inflows allows the foreign
government to reduce the share of speculative capital flows, e.g. to increase the share of long-
term capital flows. In other words, capital inflows can affect the composition of aggregate
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capital. This is really not a new idea. It was first proposed by Tobin (1978) in order to ‘’throw
sand in the wheels” of speculative capital. Magud et al. (2011) find similar theoretical results.
Similarly, we can identify the determinants of long-term investment, LCF:
Lemma 2 The share of capital invested in a long-term project (ω) depends positively on the return in
the LCF target country (α)
Next, we consider the difference between a fully flexible exchange rate and a completely
pegged exchange rate. The difference is characterized by λ, the frequency of jumps occurring
in the Poisson process dqt. If λ→ 0, the jump occurs more and more rarely and the size of the
jump becomes bigger and bigger (recall that the size of the jump is eλ ). In the case of λ = 0,
jumps never occur and the UIP never holds. If λ → ∞, the jumps occur very frequently, but
each jump is very small. For λ = ∞, the UIP will always hold. In all the intermediate cases
– 0 < λ < ∞ – the UIP will only hold at the moment of a jump but never in between. Flood
and Rose (2002) empirically found that the UIP functions poorly in countries with a fixed rate
regime. This model rationalizes Flood and Rose’s finding. The link between λ, ν and the UIP
condition can be summarized as follow:
{λ, ν}

λ = 0 ⇒ ν = ∞ UIP never holds
0 < λ < ∞ ⇒ ν = eλ UIP holds only at the moment of a jump
λ = ∞ ⇒ ν = 0 UIP will always hold
Proposition 3 A country that keeps its exchange rate perfectly pegged (λ → 0) gives a speculative
investor a premium equal to the inflation differential (ε), compared to a country with a fully flexible
exchange rate (λ→ ∞).
Proof See appendix 3 2
By formulating proposition 3 less technically, we can conclude that a country with a pegged
exchange rate pays an extra interest rate to the speculators’ capital that is equal to its inflation
rate. If the peg is fully credible, the inflation differential is zero and there is no premium
for foreign investors. Proposition 3 highlights the difference between pure monetary regimes
and hybrid monetary regimes. Under a pure monetary regime, speculators only earn the real
interest rate. Under a hybrid monetary regime, speculators benefit from a real interest rate
and from inflation differentials since the exchange rate is not flexible enough to offset this
difference. In other words, since both regimes suppose that there is a one-to-one relationship
between the nominal interest rates and the inflation rates of countries, ceteris paribus, cross-
country differences in the exchange rate regimes can explain the differences in the pattern
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of speculative capital inflows. Proposition 3 therefore rationalizes the findings in section 2.2:
table 1 and figure 2. The empirical part seeks to test if the results hold under statistical
inferences.
4 Estimation and Methodology
4.1 Predictions derived from the theoretical model
Through the different propositions and lemmas, this paper has shown that the main deter-
minants of short-term capital inflows are: controls on inflows, nominal interest rate differen-
tials between countries because of inflation differentials, and the nature of the exchange rate
regimes. In return I have also shown that profits from inflation differentials depend on the
exchange rate regimes. In other words, the model predicts that ceteris paribus, capital controls,
inflation rates and exchange rate regimes should be the main determinant of short-term capi-
tal inflows. The dependent variable is defined as in the theoretical part: (1− wt) = St/Wt i.e.
the share of short-term capital inflows over total capital inflows.
Short-Term Capitali,t
Total Capital Inflowsi,t
= β0+ β1Inflationi,t + β2ERRi,t + β3Capital Controlsi,t + β
′
Xi,t +µt +Ui,t
where i = 1, · · · , 70 indexes for countries and t = 1, · · · , 28 indexes the years (from 1980
to 2009). The dependent variable, the share of short term capital over total capital inflows
is regressed on the inflation rate, capital account openness, and exchange rate dummies for
hard peg and intermediate peg. The flexible regime is thus the reference. I intend to compare
pegged and flexible exchange rate regimes. Another control variable is money supply, which
allows me to take into account liquidity. Rodrik and Velasco (1999) and Komulainen and
Lukkarila (2003) have shown that this variable is among the main determinants of short-term
debt.
The above equation is estimated using different regression techniques to address the var-
ious short-comings of standard OLS. For example, to control for the potential endogeneity of
inflation, this variable is instrumented by using its lagged values.
Since the goal of this paper is first and foremost to explain the geography of speculative
capital inflows, I include the year fixed effect instead of the country fixed effects: the identifi-
cation strategy relies on differences across countries within each year. The model predicts that
β1 > 0, β2 > 0, and β3 < 0. In other words, speculative capital are more likely to flow into
countries with high inflation, managed exchange rate regimes, and open financial account.
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4.2 Estimation Results
Tables 2 and 3 are my baseline results and are presented in the following paragraph. Addi-
tional control variables and robustness checks follow in the following paragraph.
4.2.1 Main Results
Table 2 is the benchmark regression in which pegged and flexible exchange rate regimes are
compared. The first column is an ordinary least square with the year fixed effect, while the
third column presents general method of moment to deal with endogeneity. The regressions
are performed for the full sample, and for both developed and developing countries. All vari-
ables have expected signs. Money supply which is the proxy of liquidity is positively linked to
short term capital inflows. We now arrive at the variables of interest for our proposed model
on the pattern of speculative capital inflows. As predicted by the model, higher inflation
is associated to higher short-term capital inflows. Crucial for our theory, the regression for
the full sample shows that countries with pegged exchange rate regimes received significantly
higher short-term capital inflows than countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. A deeper
analysis shows that this conclusion is valid for both developing and developed countries.
The former literature focused mainly on the role of capital controls on speculative capital.
Of course, having a direct measure of capital controls is difficult. But we may get an idea
of the countries’ financial account restrictions by using the Chinn-Ito’s index. We expected
countries with more capital controls to receive less speculative capital inflows. By including
this index (see table 3), it is found that it is indeed the case, but that the coefficient is not
significant, which means that capital controls seem to play an insignificant role in fending
off ‘’hot money”. The former literature reached the same conclusion 1. Our novelty is to
show that the nature of the exchange rate regimes is more effective. This conclusion does not
depend on the choice of the sample. By comparing table 2 and table 3 we see that these results
are valid for both developing and developed countries. The ineffectiveness of capital controls
is theoretically documented by Gros (1987). Capital controls are innefective because financial
operators always find a way to get round controls in order to make the same transactions.
4.2.2 Robustness Check and Extension
Robustness Check: The results discussed above are broadly consistent with the main thesis
of this paper, the fact that the nature of the exchange rate regimes is more important than
1The exception is Magud et al. (2011). They showed theoretically conditions under which capital controls can
work or not, their effectiveness depending mainly on country-specific characteristics
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capital controls on the allocation of speculative capital inflows. This section seeks to check
how robust this conclusion is and its level of sensitivity by adding more controls.
Table 4 and table 5 add more macroeconomic controls. The first variable is the quality of
institutions. Alfaro et al. (2007) documented that the main determinant of long term capital
flows is the quality of institutions. The regressions confirm this result. Speculative capital
inflows and the quality of institutions are negatively correlated. The GDP growth rate is
also added to take into account economic perspectives. Higher growth is associated with
good/long-term perspectives that attract more long-term capital. As expected, speculative
capital inflows and GDP growth are negatively correlated. Population is also added as a
control for size. Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are mainly small countries and
hence attract more speculative capital. Indeed, the correlation between speculative capital
inflows and population is negative.
If we compare table 4 and table 5 with table 2 and table 3, we see that even though the
new variables carry the signs expected and have significance, they do not strongly affect the
results of the benchmark regression. Quantitatively, they remain significant and carry the
signs expected, and qualitatively the main conclusion holds: the nature of the exchange rate
regime plays a role on the allocation of speculative capital inflows. Capital controls do not
affect this allocation.
Extension: Through the theoretical and the empirical parts of this paper, I demonstrated
that it is possible to explain the pattern of speculative capital inflows across the world. The
main conclusion is that: speculative capital inflows are more likely to flow into countries
with managed exchange rates, higher inflation rates, higher ratio of money supply over gross
domestic product, poor quality of institutions, low gross domestic product growth, and low
population size through its link with the nature of exchange rate regimes. In line with former
literature, I also showed that capital controls do not affect speculative capital. To explain
the geography of speculative capital, I did not exploit the time variation of the series. It is
possible to move beyond cross country comparison by investigating within-country variation: is
a country more likely to receive less speculative capital inflows when its exchange rate regime
becomes relatively less pegged? This can be achieved only by introducing country fixed effect
and year fixed effect. I began by creating a new classification of the exchange rate regime that
combines the pegged dummy, the intermediate dummy, and the flexible dummy in one index.
This new index takes a value of zero if for a given year in a given country, the exchange rate
is pegged. It takes a value of one if for a given year in a given country, the exchange rate is
an intermediated pegged. And it takes a value of two if for a given year in a given country,
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the exchange rate is fully flexible. In other words, an increase in this index means that the
exchange rate is becoming more flexible. The index is called “Exchange regime”.
The results are displayed in table 6. As we can see, all variables carry expected signs. When
the within-country variation is exploited, all the variables continue to behave as predicted. The
variable of interest, that is, the exchange rate regime index is negative and significant across
all the specifications. This means that when a country moves relatively from a pegged to an
intermediate regime, or from an intermediate to a flexible regime, this country will receive
less speculative capital inflows.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implication
A large body of literature studied the causes and the consequences of the Asian financial crisis.
As noted by Rodrik and Velasco (1999) all these countries had on thing in common: large level
of short-term foreign debt. This paper studied a broader type of short-term capital inflows and
focused on gross capital inflows rather than net capital inflows. I show that it is possible
to explain the geography of short-term capital inflows. Although the previous literature had
focused on capital controls, I demonstrated how important the nature of exchange rate regimes
is and the link between the monetary regime and the exchange rate regime. The main policy
implication of this paper is the following: if the only goal is to fend off “hot money”, as
in Mexico in 1994, moving from a pegged exchange rate to a flexible exchange rate is more
efficient than imposing controls on inflows. But adopting a flexible exchange rate can induce
other costs and trade-offs between a pegged and a flexible exchange rate when fending off
“hot money” is not the primary objective of the policy makers is open to future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of the Different Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1’
The first order condition of (4) using (12) is
0 = (1− ρ) rr f − (RF − piH)
(ωrr f + (1−ω)(RF − piH) + ρ
rr f − (RF − piF)
(ωrr f + (1−ω)(RF − piF)
This is equivalent to M = 0 with
M = (1− ρ)[rr f − (RF−piH)][ωrr f +(1−ω)(RF−piF)]+ ρ[rr f − (RF−piF)][ωrr f +(1−ω)(RF−piH)]
From this I get
∂M
∂ω
= (1− ρ)[rr f − (RF − piH)][rr f − (RF − piF)] + ρ[rr f − (RF − piF)][rr f − (RF − piH)] < 0
∂M
∂ρ
= −[rr f − (RF − piH)][ωrr f + (1−ω)(RF − piF)] + [rr f − (RF − piF)][(ωrr f + (1−ω)(RF − piH)] < 0
∂M
∂piF
= (1− ρ)[rr f − (RF − piH)][−(1−ω)] + ρ[(ωrr f + (1−ω)(RF − piH)] > 0


















Proof of Proposition 1’
I start out with the general solution of the model. In order to maximize (12) subject to (26)
I need to maximize the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation H with respect to ωt (cf. Merton









IWW(Wt, t)W2t [(1−ωt)2(σ2 + σ20 + Cov(dxt, dzt))] + λ[I(Wt(
ε
λ
(1−ωt) + 1), t)− I(Wt, t)]
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The first-order condition for an interior solution is: Hωt = 0. I postulate I(Wt, t) in a time-
separable form as
I(Wt, t) = e−ρt[δ1 log(Wt) + δ0] (30)
where δ0 and δ1 are to be determined from (29). Substituting (30) into (29) and simplifying
yields
H = e−ρt[log(Wt) + δ1(ωtα+ (1−ωt)(ε+ (1− τ)r0))− ρ(δ1 log(Wt) + δ0)
−1
2
δ1[(1−ωt)2(σ2 + σ20 + Cov(dxt, dzt))] + λ(δ1 log(
ε
λ
(1−ωt) + 1)− δ0))] (31)
Abbreviating the variance term as
X = (σ2 + σ20 + Cov(dxt, dzt)) (32)
we can now write the FOC as
0 = Hωt = e
−ρt[δ1(α− ε− (1− τ)r0) + δ1(1−ωt)X− δ1λ e
λ+ e(1−ωt) ]
In order to compute the effect of ε and λ on ωt we define
M = (α− ε− (1− τ)r0) + (1−ωt)X− λ e
λ+ e(1−ωt) (33)















(λ+ e(1−ωt))2 > 0.
which implies: ∂ω∂ε = − ∂M/∂ε∂M/∂ω < 0 and ∂ω∂λ = − ∂M/∂λ∂M/∂ω > 0 2
Proof of Proposition 2
Using the proof for proposition 1’ and ∂M∂τ = r0 > 0 we obtain
∂ω
∂τ = − ∂M/∂τ∂M/∂ω > 0 . 2
Proof of Proposition 2
Using the proof for proposition 1’ and ∂M∂α = 1 we obtain
∂ω
∂α = − ∂M/∂α∂M/∂ω > 0 2
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Proof of Proposition 3




M(λ) = (α− ε− r0)− (1−ωt)X (34)
lim
λ→∞
M(λ) = (α− ε− r0)− (1−ωt)X− ε (35)
Consequently: limλ→0 M(λ)− limλ→∞ M(λ) = ε 2
Table 2: Benchmark regression: Short-term inflows regressions across ERR
OLS GMM
β t-stat β t-stat
Full sample
Hard peg 0.0568** 2.2918 0.0852** 2.3203
Intermediate peg 0.0422* 1.7879 0.0847** 2.6021
Inflation 0.0029*** 3.6213 0.0031*** 2.8572
Money supply/GDP 0.0183** 2.2480 0.0089 0.5565
Constant 0.1962*** 6.5951 0.1662*** 5.1478
Observations 1430 1430
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Number of countries 69 69
R-squared (Between) 0.128
Developed countries
Hard peg 0.0626** 2.2791 0.0779* 1.8392
Intermediate peg 0.1042*** 2.9387 0.0720 0.8990
Inflation 0.0044** 2.0075 0.0036 1.5736
Money supply/GDP 0.0236*** 9.6080 0.0244*** 9.4372
Constant 0.2181*** 4.9720 0.2281*** 4.8381
Observations 305 305
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Number of countries 20 20
R-squared (Between) 0.595
Developing countries
Hard peg 0.0654** 2.3716 0.1060** 2.2935
Intermediate peg 0.0343 1.0368 0.0874** 2.1936
Inflation 0.0024*** 2.8555 0.0028** 2.3726
Money supply/GDP 0.0089 0.6316 0.0011 0.0376
Constant 0.2135*** 4.8675 0.1636*** 3.8037
Observations 1125 1125
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Number of countries 49 49
R-squared (Between) 0.100
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of short term capital inflows over total capital inflows (short + long). White’s
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistic are given in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The columns GMM deal with the
fact that some variable (e.g. inflation) can be endogenous. Developed countries refer to OECD countries. For the exchange rate
classification, the omitted category is flexible exchange rate regimes.
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(a) Australian dollar (b) Malaysian ringgit
Figure 4: Continuous vs Discrete Devaluations
Table 3: Benchmark regression: adding capital control using Chinn-Ito Index
OLS GMM
β t-stat β t-stat
Full sample
Hard peg 0.0582** 1.9673 0.1018*** 2.9284
Intermediate peg 0.0402 1.5935 0.0879** 2.5058
Inflation 0.0031*** 3.8093 0.0034*** 2.9836
Money supply/GDP 0.0184** 2.1973 0.0123 0.8134
Capital controls -0.0054 -0.5236 -0.0283 -1.4403
Chinn-Ito index
Constant 0.2023*** 5.9808 0.1848*** 4.9739
Observations 1413 1413
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Number of countries 69 69
R-squared (Between) 0.112
Developed countries
Hard peg 0.0470** 1.9829 0.0626 1.3584
Intermediate peg 0.0979*** 3.1146 0.0857 1.4201
Inflation 0.0047** 2.2843 0.0036 1.5724
Money supply/GDP 0.0252*** 14.8333 0.0260*** 10.7450
Capital controls -0.0163 -1.1384 -0.0107 -0.6280
Chinn-Ito index
Constant 0.2426*** 4.9478 0.2409*** 4.6935
Observations 297 297
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Number of countries 20 20
R-squared (Between) 0.646
Developing countries
Hard peg 0.0770** 1.9962 0.1305*** 3.0150
Intermediate peg 0.0329 0.9349 0.0931** 2.2160
Inflation 0.0026*** 3.1081 0.0031** 2.4565
Money supply/GDP 0.0081 0.5395 0.0034 0.1286
Capital controls 0.0066 0.4800 -0.0164 -0.7309
Chinn-Ito index
Constant 0.2076*** 4.5583 0.1607*** 3.5563
Observations 1116 1116
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Number of countries 49 49
R-squared (Between) 0.0741
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of short term capital inflows over total capital inflows (short + long). White’s
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistic are given in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The columns GMM deal with the
fact that some variable (e.g. inflation) can be endogenous. Developed countries refer to OECD countries. For the exchange rate
classification, the omitted category is flexible exchange rate regimes.
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Table 4: More Covariates: OLS Regression of Short-Term Inflows
(1) (2) (3)
Hard peg 0.0548** 0.0598** 0.0601**
[1.9673] [1.9816] [1.9926]
Intermediate peg 0.0290 0.0408 0.0390
[1.0836] [1.6080] [1.5410]
Inflation 0.0034*** 0.0030*** 0.0031***
[4.4317] [3.7488] [3.7404]
Liquidity 0.0115 0.0179** 0.0192**
Money supply/GDP [1.3939] [2.1533] [2.3649]
Capital controls -0.0042 -0.0061 -0.0072
Chinn-Ito Index [-0.3640] [-0.5745] [-0.6972]
Quality of institutions -0.0014** - -
Freedom house index [-2.0287] - -
Business Cycle - -0.0006 -
GDP growth - [-0.3931] -
Population - - -0.1370**
- - [-2.1190]
Constant 0.2063*** 0.2052*** 0.2126***
[5.6987] [6.0652] [6.2237]
Observations 1218 1393 1410
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 66 69 69
R-squared (Between) 0.218 0.126 0.142
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of short term capital inflows over total capital inflows (short + long). White’s
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistic are given in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the exchange rate classification,
the omitted category is flexible exchange rate regimes.
Table 5: More Covariates: GMM Regression of Short-Term Inflows
(1) (2) (3)
Hard peg 0.0886** 0.1052*** 0.0970***
[2.0867] [3.0205] [2.8219]
Intermediate peg 0.0523 0.0956*** 0.0890**
[1.5810] [2.8190] [2.4956]
Inflation 0.0035*** 0.0032*** 0.0034***
[2.6678] [2.9428] [2.9764]
Liquidity 0.0047 0.0121 0.0152
Money supply/GDP [0.3237] [0.8088] [1.0637]
Capital controls -0.0282 -0.0310 -0.0352*
Chinn-Ito Index [-1.3943 [-1.5839] [-1.7924]
Business cycle - -0.0014 -
GDP growth - [-0.9622] -
Quality of institutions -0.0017** - -
Freedom house index [-2.1063] - -
Population - - -0.1973***
- - [-3.2407]
Constant 0.2109*** 0.1897*** 0.2062***
[6.5051] [4.9559] [5.4432]
Observations 1218 1393 1410
Number of countries 66 69 69
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of short term capital inflows over total capital inflows (short + long). White’s
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistic are given in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the exchange rate classification,
the omitted category is flexible exchange rate regimes.
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Table 6: Within country estimate: OLS Regression of Short-Term Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exchange regime -0.0348* -0.0302** -0.0348** -0.0335*
[-1.8748] [-1.9788] [-1.9791] [-1.7979]
Inflation 0.0022** 0.0025*** 0.0022** 0.0023**
[2.5916] [3.0228] [2.5330] [2.5875]
Liquidity 0.0146 0.0040 0.0145 0.0166
Money supply/GDP [1.3137] [0.3034] [1.2945] [1.5601]
Capital controls -0.0149 -0.0138 -0.0149 -0.0142
Chinn-Ito index [-1.3389] [-1.0476] [-1.3427] [-1.2647]
Quality of institutions -0.0011*





Constant 0.3104*** 0.3189*** 0.3136*** 0.3412***
[19.0570] [19.6043] [18.4978] [16.3495]
Observations 1413 1218 1393 1410
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 69 66 69 69
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of short term capital inflows over total capital inflows (short + long). White’s
heteroskedasticity-consistant t-statistic are given in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the exchange rate classification,
the omitted category is flexible exchange rate regimes.
Algeria Angola Argentina Australia Austria Barbados Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria China Colombia Costa-Rica Croatia
Cyprus Dominican-Republic Ecuador Egypt El-Salvador Finland France Gabon Ghana Greece Guatemala Honduras Hungary
Iceland India Indonesia Iran Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Korea Kuwait Libya Malta Mauritius Mexico Morocco
Netherlands Norway Pakistan Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Singapore South Africa Spain Sri-Lanka
Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syria Thailand Tunisia Turkey United-Kingdom United-States Uruguay Venezuela Yemen
Table 7: List of countries
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